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1. Background and introduction 
Since the early 1990s there has been an increasing emphasis in Western welfare states on active labour 
market programmes (ALMP) to combat high and persistent unemployment and promote labour force 
participation. The activation policies have first and foremost been directed at people who have lost 
their jobs and receive unemployment insurance benefits, but the emphasis on work and activation is 
also part of an international ideological shift in the thinking about social security in general. It stems 
from a widespread concern over long-term passive receipt of welfare benefits. For society as a whole 
welfare benefits are costly, and for the individual the role as recipient may undermine responsibility 
and self-sufficiency and cause passivity and dependence. 
 
In the wake of the spread of ALMP, different programmes in many countries have been evaluated (for 
an overview, see e.g. Heckman et. al. 1999, Kluve 2006, Martin and Grubb 2001). In Norway, various 
aspects of the impact of ALMP targeted at the insured unemployed have been extensively examined 
over the last decade (e.g. Aakvik 1998, Raaum, Torp and Tzhang 2002, Røed and Raaum 2006). 
However, much less attention has been given to the impact of active measures directed at more 
disadvantaged groups such as social security recipients. A few recent exceptions are Dahl (2003), who 
analyses a so-called 'workfare' scheme in Norwegian municipalities, and Dahl and Lorentzen (2005), 
and Lorentzen and Dahl (2005) who analyse the outcome for social security recipients who participate 
in ordinary ALMP. 
 
Recently, the Norwegian Government issued an Action Plan to Combat Poverty [hereafter referred to 
as just the Action Plan; St.meld nr. 6 (2002-3)] that singles out long-term recipients of social security 
as one of the main target groups. Central to the plan is a broad spectrum of rehabilitation and 
activation measures intended to help moving this group from welfare to work, and this includes the 
close cooperation of two large welfare sectors, The National Employment Service (state level) and 
The Social security System (municipality level). The initiative is thus 'tailor-made' for more vulnerable 
groups, and the scope has increased from 1 250 slots in 31 municipalities at the introduction in 2003 to 
about 3 900 slots and an aim of making the programme country comprehensive by 2007. 
 
Shortly after introduction, the government called for a large-scale evaluation of the special labour 
market initiative for welfare recipients, and the results presented here are part of this evaluation. The 
analysis covers the period 2003-2004, which means that we only address short-term effects. Our 
contribution is twofold: First, using survival analysis and hazard rate regression we analyse transitions 
to work among social security recipients who participate in the programme, and study the 
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determinants of this process. Second, we address the question of programme effects, i.e. we assess 
whether the observed outcome can be ascribed to participation in the programme. To do this, we adopt 
a quasi-experimental design based on propensity score matching. 
 
The paper is organised as follows: In the next chapter we take a brief glance at the Norwegian setting, 
including labour market and welfare policies, and the special initiative directed at social security 
recipients. Then follows a short summary of the findings of previous evaluation studies, based on data 
from other countries as well as from Norway. The theoretical framework for the analyses is outlined in 
chapter four, and chapter five explains our empirical approach. More information on data and 
variables can be found in chapter six, and the results of the analyses are reported in chapter seven. 
Chapter eight concludes with a short summary and discussion. 
2. The Norwegian setting 
All employees in Norway under the age of 67 are covered by the National Insurance System, which is 
financed by general taxes. When unemployed, insured individuals who register at an employment 
office receive unemployment insurance (UI) benefits. Newcomers to the labour market and others who 
have not been gainfully employed are not entitled to UI benefits, but may apply for welfare benefits 
(social security). Welfare benefits are means tested and can in principle be received for an unlimited 
period, whereas UI benefits can only be received for a limited period. 1 The administration of the 
disbursement of welfare benefits is placed in the hands of the municipalities, which are also 
responsible for the organisation of different measures to assist welfare benefit recipients in becoming 
self-supporting. 
 
The stated goal of ALMPs is to enhance the participants' prospects of obtaining ordinary work, to 
improve their qualifications, and to dampen the negative consequences of being out of work in terms 
of discouragement and loss of self-esteem. The programmes are funded by the central government and 
organised by the local employment service under the supervision of the Directorate of Labour and 
Welfare and the Ministry of Labour and Social Inclusion. During the 1990s, the ALMPs grew 
considerably, and by the turn of the century Norway had taken over Sweden's leading role as the 
country in Europe with the largest share of active labour market policy measures relative to passive 
(Raaum, Røed and Torp 2002). Later, Sweden has regained its top ranking, but in 2003-2004 the cost 
                                                     
1 After 1997 the maximum period for UI benefits has been 156 weeks or 78 weeks for people with little previous work 
practice (Røed and Raaum 2006).  
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of ALMPs in Norway still constituted close to 50 per cent of the total public budget for labour market 
policies (OECD 2007). 
  
The ALMPs can basically be divided into four main groups: labour market training, temporary public 
employment, employment (wage) subsidy, and work practice schemes (Røed and Raaum 2006). 
Training and employment subsidies are the largest programmes, while work practice is typically 
offered to youth and immigrants with little work experience. Programme slots are established in close 
conjunction with the business cycles, i.e. more places are offered when the economy is sluggish, as it 
was during the first half of the 1990s. In the mid-1990s, ordinary ALMPs were mostly targeted at the 
insured unemployed, but not exclusively. Welfare recipients who were judged fit to work also had 
access to these programmes, but the labour market offices were often quite particular about who they 
selected (Lorentzen and Dahl 2005). 
 
The ideological re-orientation towards work and activation also influenced the thinking about social 
security, and in 2002 the government issued an Action plan to combat poverty [St.meld nr. 6 (2002-3)] 
that expresses a firm belief in activation measures as a means of increasing work activity, earnings and 
self-sufficiency among vulnerable groups. In addition to long-term social recipients the target groups 
were young people aged 20-24, single parents, immigrants and people who receive drug substitution 
treatment. The novelty of this programme was that it involved a closer cooperation between the Social 
Security Service and the National Employment Service. Previously, these sectors did not cooperate 
very well, and social security applicants were regularly sent from the social security office to register 
as job seekers at the employment services, but most of them were sent back to the social services with 
the label 'unable to seek employment or to benefit from vocational rehabilitation' (Schafft and 
Spjelkavik 2006). In addition, the labour market courses for the participants of the new programme 
were different from traditional courses as the participants were given a much closer individual follow-
up from both services. 
 
The special vocational rehabilitation programme for social security recipients was launched in 2003 
with 1 250 slots in 31 municipalities and has been expanded every year since. In 2006 the goal was to 
make the programme country comprehensive, and for 2007 the government grant will fund about 3900 
slots at a cost of about NOK 600 million (about EUR 75 million). 
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3. Theoretical considerations 
Work and activation programmes may influence the functioning of the labour market in many ways, 
through direct effects on the participants (changed search behaviour, improved work competence etc.) 
and through indirect effects on non-participants (e.g. increased competition for ordinary jobs). In 
addition the programmes may have a general effect on both the non-employed and employers, as the 
possibility of programme participation will be part of the choice set of the former, while the latter may 
take the extent of labour market programmes into consideration in their wage setting (Calmfors et al. 
2002). 
 
The most obvious effect of labour market programmes is on the participants, and this will be the focus 
of our analysis. Various training and work practice programmes will increase the participants' human 
capital and work capabilities and make them more attractive on the labour market. Hence, they are 
more likely to be offered a job. Activity measures may also increase the participants' work motivation 
and make them more effective as job seekers. These effects will increase the productivity of the 
participants, both as potential employees and as job seekers, and thus their employment probability 
will increase. However, there may also be so-called locking-in effects, i.e. programme participation 
may dampen search activity and make the job seekers more choosy. Such effects may first and 
foremost prevail during qualification and training periods, as there will be less time for job search, and 
the participants will wish to complete the course before starting to look for employment. Participation 
in work practice and employment schemes may also have such an effect, but this will partly be 
counteracted by the presumed positive contribution from getting in touch with potential employers. 
 
In a welfare state with generous benefits to those who are not gainfully employed there may be 
relatively few who are willing to accept jobs that imply that they will be just marginally better off if 
they start working. Within the framework of search theory (Mortensen 1986) this means that their 
reservation wage is higher than their market wage, i.e. the lowest wage they are willing to accept in 
order to start working is higher than the wage associated with job-offers they are likely to receive. A 
reduction in the benefit level would then reduce the reservation wage and be an incentive for non-
employed people to seek more actively for a job and increase their likelihood of becoming employed. 
 
However, in this simple version search theory ignores many important aspects of non-employment. 
For example, if people have been outside the labour market for a long time, they may have become too 
discouraged to start searching for a job, even if the benefit level is reduced. Such 'discouragement' 
effects (Rosholm and Toomet 2005) have recently been reported for married women in Norway 
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(Dagsvik et. al. 2006) and may particularly strike non-employed people with low productivity as job-
seekers and employees, e.g. long-term recipients of social security, immigrants and other vulnerable 
groups. Hence, economic incentives may have a more ambiguous effect on marginal groups than on 
core groups on the labour market. The predictions of the simple version of the search model are 
furthermore at odds with other fields of research, e.g. 'economics of happiness' research and research 
in the intersection between economics and social psychology. Findings from these fields suggest that 
having a job increases life quality beyond the increased utility from higher income, as gainful 
employment yields status, improved self worth and self confidence, and gives a firm structure to 
everyday life (Jahoda 1981, Warr 1987 as cited in Rosholm 2005). 
 
One of the goals of ALMPs is to improve the qualifications of non-employed with low productivity 
and to match vacant resources to the existing demand for labour. In the Norwegian labour market, 
which is characterised by high minimum wages and strong labour unions, it is relatively difficult to 
enter the labour market for particularly disadvantaged groups with few qualifications. This is often the 
situation for long-term social security recipients, immigrants and other vulnerable groups. Training 
programmes may thus be particularly helpful for these groups. In addition, participants in ALMPs will 
be provided with a network that may be useful in finding a job. Both these effects imply that the 
probability of receiving a job offer will increase. However, the participant's reservation wage may also 
rise, as there will be more alternatives to choose from and he or she will probably expect a bonus in 
terms of higher wages. 
 
ALMPs may also be used to test if a non-employed person really is available for the labour market. If 
people are not willing to be activated, they will presumably not be willing to work either. Others may 
want an ordinary job, but do not like to take part in an activation plan. If there is an underlying threat 
behind the offer of programme participation, e.g. that benefits will be reduced otherwise, the element 
of force may drive many people who are poorly motivated into the programme. This may also harm 
the outcome for other participants, and is particularly unfortunate if slots are rationed, which is often 
the case. Hence, a negative selection into the programme may hamper the effect of ALMPs.   
 
A priori, the expected total effect of ALMPs is thus ambiguous, but our assumption is that the positive 
effects will outweigh the negative especially for marginal groups in the labour market such as the ones 
we are dealing with in the present analysis, and especially as the vocational rehabilitation programme 
in question is mainly based on voluntary participation and a close individual follow-up. One may, 
however, hypothesise that some groups will benefit more than others, and that possibly those with the 
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poorest labour market prospects may profit the most. A prerequisite is, of course, that it is possible to 
find suitable jobs for this kind of labour, and this will largely depend on the business cycle. In a boom 
with a great demand for labour there will be more job openings for less productive people, and more 
will be able to make the move from passive dependency into active participation in the labour market. 
For Norway, it has e.g. been demonstrated that the training effects of ALMPs for unemployed people 
are larger when economic conditions are favourable than in business cycle slumps (Raaum, Torp and 
Zhang 2002). 
4. Previous findings 
Evaluations of labour market programmes give a somewhat mixed picture concerning effects. Most of 
the evaluations are American studies, and it is uncertain whether it is possible to generalise these 
findings to other countries because of differences in labour markets and target populations (Dahl and 
Lorentzen 2005). Yet, some authors are more optimistic in this respect as the main patterns from 
European studies are similar to the American studies (Heckman et. al. 1999). One meta-analysis from 
the US has shown positive results for employment, but the programmes had less effect on poverty 
(Michalopoulos and Schwartz 2000). An important point, however, is that the most disadvantaged 
seems to benefit the most from work-programmes. The general findings seem to be that for most 
participants, the benefits are modest, and varies between type of programmes and target groups. There 
are also heterogeneity in treatment effects in subpopulations (Heckman et. al. 1999). One review of the 
literature from studies in the OECD countries found that in some countries there is a positive effect, 
while in others there is no or even a negative effect (Martin 2000). A more recent review considering 
159 studies from both OECD and developing countries concludes that the effects vary a great deal by 
programme design and the context the programme operates in (Betcherman et. al. 2004).  
 
In a review of more than 100 European studies, Kluve (2006) concludes that there are generally 
positive effects, although dependent on the type of programme, and that the effects are heterogeneous 
over target groups. The Swedish experiences seem to be less positive than the results from the US and 
Europe more generally. One review of Swedish studies concludes that there is little evidence that 
active labour market programmes are effective, and that the programmes would probably be more 
effective if they were carried out on a smaller scale than is currently done in Sweden (Calmfors et. al. 
2001). However, by developing more elaborate models and controlling for selection bias, Sianesi 
found a generally positive effect for Sweden (Sianesi 2004). One study from Denmark that controls for 
selection on unobservables concludes that programme effects are heterogeneous, and that those who 
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are most likely to be assigned to certain initiatives are those who benefit the least from it (Graversen 
and Jensen 2006).  
 
Until quite recently, there have been few effect evaluations of Norwegian labour market programmes, 
but the now growing body of studies largely suggests a modest positive effect of such programmes on 
both earnings and employment (Moe 2000, Raaum et.al. 2002a, Raaum et.al. 2002b, Dahl and 
Lorentzen 2005, Aakvik et.al. 2005, Hamre and Bråthen 2006). Though, one study of programmes 
directed at young social security recipients and drug-users estimated a negative effect for participants 
with some education, but a positive effect for the less educated (Pedersen 1998).  
 
Most of the evaluation literature has been of "general" programmes including target groups that might 
differ substantially from the main target group of the Action Plan considered in the present study. It 
seems fairly clear that the treatment effects are heterogeneous across subpopulations, both between 
and within target groups. Hence, it is an open question whether these lessons also apply to specific 
target groups.  
 
The literature on particularly disadvantaged groups such as social security recipients and ethnic 
minorities are scarcer. Lessons from work programmes directed at social security recipients are largely 
American. A recent meta-study based on 46 work programmes concluded that the programmes have a 
small and consistent effect on employment, earnings and welfare payments during the first six years 
after intervention (Smedslund et. al. 2006). This particular meta-analysis considered only studies that 
used randomised assignment, with the result that only studies from the USA and Canada were 
included, as they had not found any proper randomised trials from European countries. This does not 
imply that there are no high-quality studies done in Europe, however. A number of other kinds of 
studies do exist, but few European studies pay proper attention to the issue of unobserved selection 
effects (see Dahl and Lorentzen 2005: 88).  
 
The Norwegian literature is meagre in this field. One study distinguishes between employment 
programmes and training programmes, where the latter was found to have a modest positive effect and 
the former had no mean impact (Dahl and Lorentzen 2005). However, they also found that 
employment programmes had no impact for the most and least disadvantaged in the target group, but 
did have a positive impact for those in the middle range. Many participants in these programmes do 
not only follow one programme, but chains of programmes. Not all such chains are equally efficient, 
but most have, nevertheless, a positive effect (Lorentzen and Dahl 2005).  
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When young people are concerned, which are one of the target groups of the Action plan, there are 
also mixed evidence from previous research. There are some examples of positive results from the 
OECD countries (Martin and Grubb 2001) and the U.S. (Heckman et. al. 1999). On the other hand, 
Swedish experiences are not very positive (Calmfors et. al. 2001). Larsson (2002) studied the effect of 
work programmes for the age group 20-24 and concluded that these programmes seem to be 
counterproductive. A Norwegian study adds more nuances to this picture, concluding that for youth, 
the effects vary by gender and age subgroups across programmes. Females seem to benefit the most 
from programmes, while males and those in the age group 21-25 do not benefit at all. There might 
even be negative effects for both males and females in this age group (Hardoy 2005). This is in line 
with the findings from a recent meta-analysis of European studies, which concludes that programmes 
aimed specifically at youth fare significantly worse than programmes targeted at the adult population 
(Kluve 2006).  
 
Most of the literature on the labour market behaviour of immigrants and ethnic minorities are not 
evaluations of work programmes. It is perhaps not surprising that other issues have been given 
priority, such as the impact of country background, labour market conditions at arrival, or whether 
they are discriminated against on the labour market. Only one Norwegian study estimates the effect of 
work programmes on non-western immigrants, controlling for selection bias. The results suggest that 
there is a positive effect for both men and women, but it varies somewhat across type of programme 
and immigration background (Kvinge and Djuve 2006). Danish experiences have also shown that the 
effects vary by immigrant group. Some groups do not experience much effect of work programmes, 
while the impact is large particularly for refugees (Rosholm 2005). It should be noted that the 
composition of immigrant population differs substantially between countries, even in Scandinavia, and 
generalisations from one country to another are therefore uncertain.  
 
In the U.S, many of the general welfare to work programmes are in practice directed at single parents 
(usually mothers), so many of the American findings concerns this group. A meta-analysis of random 
assignment programmes directed at single parents with dependent children, reveal interesting nuances 
and variations of the effects. Generally, work-first programmes have the most positive effect, but  
"participant characteristics and site environmental conditions were often equally, and sometimes more, 
important than programme characteristics" (Ashworth et.al. 2004: 200), and the impact of most 
programmes declines with time (ibid: 210). As one of the main findings from this study is that social 
environmental conditions constitute a very important factor, it is not obvious that these results are as 
relevant in a European or Norwegian setting.  
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All in all, the literature thus gives a mixed picture of the effects of work programmes. Generally, there 
seems to be a small, or moderate, positive effect. On the other hand, the effects seem to vary 
considerably between countries, types of programme and target groups. Some studies also suggest that 
the effects may be heterogeneous within target groups. Further, there are disagreements as to whether 
findings from the U.S are transferable to Europe, and even if findings from one European country are 
transferable to another. Despite of varying results, it seems that only a few studies estimate negative 
effects, except for programmes targeted at youth. The target groups of the Norwegian Action Plan are 
considered to be particularly disadvantaged or vulnerable on the labour market, and it is less clear to 
what extent work programmes are helpful for these groups. There may be reasons to expect a positive 
effect for social security recipients in general, and perhaps also for single parents. The literature on 
immigrants is meagre, but one Norwegian study suggests a positive effect for this group. As for youth, 
the effects have generally been shown to be counterproductive. 
5. Empirical approach 
5.1. Analysis of transitions to work 
As job search is a dynamic process in which the timing of employment entry is an essential event, we 
use survival analysis and hazard rate regression to study transitions to work among participants in the 
programme. It is well known from the literature that the survival function and the hazard function are 
two sides of the same coin, i.e. if we know one function we can estimate the other (see e.g. Allison 
1995). For example, if t is a continuous variable, h(t) the hazard function and S(t) the survival 
function, the following equation applies: 
(1) 


−= ∫t duuhtS 0 )(exp)(  
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(2) 
t
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t ∆
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→∆
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0
.  
In our analysis we use the survival function specification to estimate the time to employment entry 
among different target groups, while we use the hazard function specification to estimate a 
multivariate model with explanatory factors, studying the determinants of employment entry. Since 
time is measured in months in our data, we use a discrete hazard rate model specified as a logit 
function, i.e. we estimate 
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where Pt is the probability of entering work at time t, X is a vector of covariates, and β is a vector of 
parameters. In addition to process time, the X-vector consists of variables that are likely to affect 
employment entry, such as human capital variables (age, education, previous employment experience), 
possibilities and obstacles for working (e.g. family situation and the local labour market), and 
economic restrictions (income and social security benefits). 
5.2. Propensity score matching 
The effect of a treatment is in principle the difference between the observed result and the hypothetical 
result for the same person given non-treatment. Of course, only one of these results is observable. In 
an experimental setting, where individuals were randomly assigned to treatment or control, we could 
let the control group represent the counterfactual result. This is obviously not as straight forward in a 
setting where there is no randomisation. The target groups are heterogeneous groups, and it is likely to 
be some kind of selection into treatment. By applying econometric techniques, a control group can be 
constructed in a way that minimizes the problem of systematic selection bias. One such method is 
propensity score matching (PSM). In principle, we match each treated persons with an untreated 
person that is as equal as possible on all observable characteristics. This kind of technique is 
particularly well suitable when we have a large number of non-treated compared to the number of 
treated, which we have in this study. Hence, it should be possible to find a good match for most of the 
treated.  
 
The matching procedure is done by first estimating the probability of being treated conditioning on 
observable characteristics. This is done by means of a binomal logit model, as we do not distinguish 
between different types of programmes, but only by whether the persons participate or not. The 
variables used in this procedure are more or less the same as the ones used when modelling the 
transitions to employment entry (see Section 6.2). The "historical" covariates are the most important. 
Our data sources allow us to map each person's individual history when both employment and social 
security reception are concerned. We assume that this will greatly improve the matching, as much 
unobserved heterogeneity is likely to be reflected in the past history.  
 
In the next step, to avoid mismatches, we exclude all observations that had propensity score values 
outside the common region of the propensity score distribution for the treated and controls (common 
support). Only 0.3 per cent of the observations were outside the common support limits. The last step 
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in the matching procedure is then to match every participant with a non-participant on this score. We 
apply one-on-one nearest neighbour matching. To ensure a good match, one could perform exact 
match on some important characteristics. We decided to make a separate matching for each target 
group, and for each sex (except for single parents, where there were very few male participants).  
 
In some countries, such as Sweden and Denmark, all unemployed will be enrolled in a programme 
sooner or later, and hence matching on non-participants should be avoided (Sianesi 2004, Graversen 
and Jensen 2006). This is largely the case in Norway as well. However, in our context, the 
governmental Action Plan provides more than the ordinary initiatives, as it also involves a tighter 
collaboration between the Employment Services and the Social security services. This collaboration is 
assumed to be the active component in the programme (Schafft and Spjelkavik 2006). The non-
participants might participate in ordinary initiatives, but then without the joint effort of these two 
services. 
 
Since the Action Plan is an ongoing programme, the people included in our analysis started 
participating any time between April 2003 and the end of our observation period, 31 December 2004. 
Matching at only one point in time might therefore be problematic. We have chosen a practical 
solution to this, performing the matching at three time points: First, at 1st April 2003, next at 1st 
January 2004, and last at 1st July 2004. When estimating the survival function, the treated group is 
followed from the time they entered the programme, and the control group from the matching time-
point. The matching procedure outlined above was thus performed three times for each target group 
and sex, i.e. a total of 21 times.  
 
After matching, an inspection of kernel density plots showed that the distribution of propensity scores 
in the treated and non-treated groups was almost identical (Rønsen and Skarðhamar 2006). To further 
check the quality of the matching, we tested whether the groups differed on any of the conditioning 
variables, and there were no significant differences between the groups after matching (see Appendix 
Tables A1-A7). In conclusion, the matching seemed very successful. All observable variables were 
well balanced after matching, and more than 99 per cent were matched in each target group at each 
matching point. The final sample is shown in Table 1. 
 
14 
Table 1. Results from the matching procedure 
 Men Women Total 
 Participants 
before 
matching 
Participants  
after matching 
Participants 
before 
matching 
Participants  
after matching 
Per cent  
matched 
Immigrants   
  April-December 2003 1 146 1 141 599 588 99,1 
  January-June 2004 499 499 158 157 99,8 
  July-December 2004 443 443 173 172 99,8 
Single parents      
  April-December 2003 45 45 505 504 99,8 
  January-June 2004 25 24 205 203 98,7 
  July-December 2004 14 14 223 222 99,6 
Youth      
  April-December 2003 813 812 438 437 99,8 
  January-June 2004 527 526 233 232 99,7 
  July-December 2004 436 434 196 196 99,7 
Long-term welfare 
recipients 
    
 
  April-December 2003 1 108 1 106 303 303 99,9 
  January-June 2004 536 536 159 158 99,9 
  July-December 2004 458 458 118 118 100,0 
Sum 6 050 6 038 3 310 3 290 99,7 
 
6. Data, target groups and variables 
6.1. Data and target groups 
The data are extracted from a large longitudinal database in Statistics Norway covering the whole 
population of Norway. The database contains information from several administrative registers on 
individual life events that we have linked together to form complete histories of demography, 
employment, education, income and social security benefits during 1992-2004. Information on 
participants and their programme entry and exit dates was obtained directly from the Directorate of 
Labour and Welfare and merged with the data from the longitudinal database. 
 
When PSM is used as a programme evaluation tool, we also need information on people who did not 
participate, but who may be potential members of the control group. Since receipt of social security 
benefits is a main condition of programme participation, we have used this as a point of departure to 
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define the population extracted from the database. In addition, the programme comprises immigrants 
and refugees who do not necessarily receive welfare benefits, but who are believed to need special 
assistance to get a job. The data extract thus included people who: 
1. had been a resident in the country after 01.01.2003, and 
2. had received social security benefits after 01.01.2000, or 
3. were immigrants or refugees 
 
The first criterion implies that we exclude people who died or emigrated before 2003, as the 
programme was not launched before then. The second criterion is used to be able to identify long-term 
welfare recipients (defined as having received benefits for six months or more, or on and off during 
the last three years). The third criterion is necessary to include immigrants and refugees who are not 
selected by criterion two, i.e. who had not received welfare benefits during this time. Following these 
rather wide criteria the population extract consisted of almost 784 000 persons, of whom 9 368 had 
participated in the programme by the end of 2004, which was the latest update of our data at the time 
of extraction. Before matching, we investigated the range of values on all relevant variables (income, 
social security, length of unemployment etc), for the treated group and excluded all potential controls 
who had values on these variables that were outside the ranges present in the treated group. The 
population was then reduced to 539 408 persons.  
 
In addition to immigrants and refugees the programme is also especially targeted at single parents and 
young people aged 20-24 who have welfare benefits as their main source of income. As these target 
groups are fairly dissimilar, our main strategy has been to stratify the data by target group and do the 
analyses separately for each target group. Target group is not a variable that is available in the data, 
but we have used our own definition as follows:  
1. Single parents: People who have received extended child benefits as single parents during the 
last year. 
2. Immigrants: Western and non-western immigrants (including refugees) who moved to the 
country after the age of 10. 
3. Youth: People who are born in Norway or people who immigrated before the age of 10, and 
who have not yet turned 25. 
4. Long-term social security recipients: The remaining people in the data extract. 
 
These groups are not mutually exclusive. For example, a 22-year immigrant who is a single parent 
may belong to all of the three first groups. We have therefore applied a rule that allocates people to 
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one and one group only, following the above ranking, i.e. we first distinguish single parents, next 
immigrants, then youth and finally the remaining social security recipients. The ranking is based on an 
assessment of what is likely to be most important for the labour market behaviour of the person in 
question. Hence, we assume that when programme participation and labour market outcomes are 
concerned, being a single parent is more decisive than being an immigrant or a young person, and that 
those immigrants who arrived in the country as children have more in common with other Norwegian 
youth than with immigrants who came to the country later in life. The single parents group therefore 
also contains immigrants and people under the age of 25, and the immigrant group also contains young 
people. 
 
In addition to differences between the target groups we expect that the participation and labour market 
behaviour of men and women may be quite different. Hence we also estimate the models for each sex 
separately, except for single parents who mainly consist of women (94 per cent). 
6.2. Explanatory variables 
Since many of the factors that affect employment entry are likely to also affect programme 
participation, the covariates included in the hazard rate model of employment entry and the covariates 
used in the PSM model are more or less the same. The purposes of the models differ, however, as the 
former is used to study the effects of various determinants, while the latter is used to predict 
propensity scores for further input in the matching procedure. Multicollinearity will therefore be more 
of a problem in the hazard rate model, which focuses on the estimated effect of each variable. Hence, 
the hazard rate model has a more parsimonious formulation than the logit model used to predict the 
propensity scores. 
 
The variables included in the hazard rate model are shown in Table 2, which contains descriptive 
statistics for the participants' characteristics measured at programme entry. Most variables are time 
varying, but in the model they are usually fixed to the value at programme entry. This especially 
concerns variables that are likely to be influenced by programme participation such as indicators of 
previous employment and social security experience, while others are updated along with process 
time, such as age, marital status, and number and age of children.2 
 
Some variables may need a bit of explanation: Age of youngest child refers to the youngest child in the 
family (not just biological children), as this reflects the true caring situation more appropriately. The 
                                                     
2 In the PSM model all time varying variables are entered with the value they had at the time of matching.   
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variable is a combination of number of children and age of youngest child, where those with no 
children constitute one category, while the rest of the categories consist of people with children in 
different age groups. Social background is based on father's or mother's educational level.3 Usually 
father's level is used, but if unknown, mother's level is used instead. For a relatively large proportion 
and especially among immigrants there is no information on education for either parent, and therefore 
we have included a category for missing values in this variable. Some also have missing information 
of own educational level, so the same procedure is used here. Immigrant background is a dummy 
variable that equals one if the individual has immigrated herself or himself, or if she or he has two 
parents who are immigrants. Data on the local unemployment rate is linked on to the data, using 
information of place of residence and aggregate time series of the municipality unemployment rate 
from Statistics Norway (www.ssb.no/hjulet). If place of residence is unknown (concerns only a few 
people), the local unemployment rate is set to the average of the rest of the data material (3,3 per cent 
for 2003 and 4,1 per cent for 2004). 
 
In the database we are using, we have access to longitudinal information that dates back to 1992, but 
in the analyses we mainly use the history over the last three years as we assume that recent events 
have a larger impact than events that took place longer ago. Our models include several cumulated 
measures of previous employment experience: total number of years with income from labour, number 
of months employed as well as number of months unemployed during the past three years, number of 
months since last employment (counting back maximum three years), and whether the person has been 
registered as vocationally disabled during the last three years (dummy). Having received social 
security benefits is a main criterion for programme participation, and in the models we include three 
indicators for previous welfare benefit history: number of months with benefits during the past six 
months, number of months with benefits during the rest of the past three years, and number of months 
since last benefit payment (counting back maximum three years). Single parents are further entitled to 
some special benefits, the so-called transitional allowance plus extra child benefits (see e.g. Kjeldstad 
and Rønsen 2004). For this target group we therefore also include the total sum of transitional 
allowance received during the last three years and number of months with extended child benefits. The 
latter variable is also an indication of how long the individual has been a single provider the last three 
years. 
 
                                                     
3 We have created a three-group classification based on the ISCED97 standard classifications. Low corresponds to levels 0-2, 
medium to levels 3-4, and high to levels 5-6. See www.ssb.no/stabas/ 
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics of programme participants by target group 
 
All target 
groups Immigrants 
Single 
parents Youth 
Long-
time  
social 
security 
recipients 
Men (per cent) 64,6 69,2 8,3 67,2 78,4 
Age (years) 31,2 34,9 33,8 21,4 35,8 
Social background (per cent)      
  High  9,5 1,1 6,1 15,9 13,8 
  Medium 39,0 3,6 38,6 65,6 52,7 
  Low 14,4 2,3 23,8 12,7 25,9 
  Unknown 37,2 93,0 31,5 5,8 7,6 
Educational level (per cent)      
  Low 19,2 12,6 20,6 27,2 18,5 
  Medium 59,4 38,6 63,3 70,6 70,3 
  High  6,2 8,2 6,7 0,5 9,2 
  Unknown 15,2 40,6 9,4 1,8 2,1 
Age of youngest child (per cent)      
  No children < 18 years 65,7 58,5 5,4 73,6 88,8 
  0-2 years 5,9 12,3 4,5 2,3 2,9 
  3-6 years 11,1 14,2 40,7 3,9 3,7 
  7-18 years 17,3 15,1 49,4 20,3 4,7 
Marital status (per cent)      
  Unmarried 65,5 30,6 55,7 97,6 77,1 
  Married 20,5 54,9 4,3 1,9 6,4 
  Previously married 14,0 14,5 40,0 0,6 16,5 
Immigrant background (per cent) 38,8 100,0 31,4 8,4 2,7 
Refugee (per cent)  71,1    
Years since immigration   7,9    
Months employed past 3 years 7,5 6,9 6,8 8,4 7,6 
Months unemployed past 3 years 9,6 8,7 10,1 7,1 12,7 
Vocationally disabled past 3 years (per cent) 20,0 12,7 14,9 20,3 29,7 
Months with welfare benefits past 6 months 3,5 3,2 3,7 3,1 4,0 
Months with welfare benefits the rest of the past 
3 years 10,7 11,4 10,8 7,2 13,1 
Transitional allowance (1000 NOK) past 3 years   102,7   
Months with extended child benefits past 3 years   13,3   
Income from labour last year (1000 NOK) 31,0 31,7 24,3 28,7 34,9 
Years with labour income  3,9 2,2 3,8 0,6 9,2 
Densely populated area (per cent) 91,5 95,5 93,7 87,2 90,2 
Local unemployment rate 4,0 4,0 4,0 4,0 4,1 
N 9 360 3 013 1 018 2 626 2 703 
Source: FD-Trygd, Statistics Norway. 
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7. Results 
7.1. Transitions to work 
In the first step of our analyses we investigate to what extent the participants in the programme 
succeed in getting a job, whether this outcome varies with target group and how it is affected by the 
personal characteristics of the participants. But before doing so, we must decide on how to define the 
success criterion. The goal of the programme is to get the participants into an "ordinary job", but what 
kind of employment this should include is an open question. An obvious criterion is that the 
employment activity must be recorded in the employment register, but a closer inspection revealed 
that some individuals were registered as both employed and unemployed in the same month. This 
overlap may be due to incorrect dating, but it may also be real - for two reasons. First, we simplify the 
analysis by using month instead of day as our time unit. An unemployment spell that ends before an 
employment spell starts later in the same month will then be overlapping in our data. The implication 
is only that job entry will be delayed with up to a month for each individual (½ month on average), 
and this should be of no importance for the results. Second, certain ALMP activities among 
unemployed job-seekers should in fact be reported to the employment register. It is doubtful whether 
this kind of employment should be considered a success, but among disadvantaged groups with hardly 
any contact with to the labour market, it may be argued that they have come a long way towards 
success in obtaining such a job. In consensus with the Directorate of Labour and Welfare we therefore 
also consider some who are registered as both employed and unemployed as successfully employed, 
but this is limited to certain categories only: (i) those who are partly employed, (ii) those who are in 
school or on an establishment grant and (iii) those who are employed with a wage subsidy. 
 
We follow the participants from the month they enter the programme and until they become employed, 
or until censoring in December 2004, which is the latest month of observation in our data. Since the 
programme was launched in March 2003, the follow-up period is rather short. We are therefore only 
able to capture short-term effects. In the left panel of Figure 1 we have plotted the estimated Kaplan-
Meier survival function for all participants considered together. It shows that the probability of still 
being out of work falls fairly gradually over the first 7-8 months, and then subsides before it more or 
less stagnates after about 18 months. After 21 months (the maximum follow-up time) the probability 
of still being non-employed is estimated to be 0.64, i.e. the probability of getting a job before this time 
is 0.36. The small table at the bottom of the graph further shows that 25 per cent of the participants 
had entered employment within ten months. 
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The right panel of Figure 1 depicts the survival function for each target group. We notice that there are 
significant differences between the curves, indicating that immigrants and young people have a bigger 
chance of getting a job than single parents and long-term social security recipients. Twenty-one 
months after registering in the programme the probability of not yet being employed is estimated to be 
0.61 among youth, 0.62 among immigrants, 0.66 among single parents and 0.69 among other social 
security recipients. Within nine months 25 per cent of the two former target groups had entered 
employment, while it took 11 months for the two latter groups to reach the same proportion. 
 
Since the estimated survival rates in Figure 1 do not control for personal characteristics, the observed 
differences in employment chances between target groups may just result from the fact that these 
participants are very heterogeneous. The multivariate analyses in Table 3 confirm that this is so. When 
controlled for covariates there are no longer any differences in employment chances between the target 
groups - not when male and female participants are analysed together (column 1), nor when the model 
is estimated for each gender separately (columns 2 and 3). There are also very few effects of gender, 
age and social background. When the participants' own education is concerned, a clear positive effect 
is found in most target groups, except among young people who still have relatively low education and 
among female long-term social security recipients. Marital status does not seem to affect employment 
entry at all, but having small children delays the process even among men, and especially among male 
long-term recipients of social security. Being a refugee makes it harder to find work for immigrant 
women, but not for immigrant men. Time since immigration, on the other hand, has only an effect on 
men. The effect is non-linear and is fairly low and stable the first few years whereupon it increases 
with time since immigration. 
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Figure 1.  Transitions to employment since entry into the programme. All participants and by 
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What seems to matter most for employment entry, however, is the past employment and social 
security history. Longer work experience has a clear positive effect on the likelihood of getting a job, 
in particular fairly recent experience gained during the last three years, but among long-term social 
security recipients also total experience as reflected by number of years with income from labour. 
Conversely, previous unemployment experience and having been vocationally disabled in the past 
both have clear negative effects, but the former mainly applies to male immigrants and single parents, 
and the latter mainly youth. 
 
Higher labour income last year also has a clear positive effect on the transition to work, except among 
single parents. As labour income is a product of hours worked and hourly wage, higher income may 
reflect both higher wage and longer hours, but since both effects normally are assumed to be positive, 
the combined effect is as expected. Greater dependence on social security in the past pulls in the 
opposite direction, and recent experience seems to matter more than somewhat older experience. 
Number of months with social security assistance the past six months has a significant negative effect 
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on employment entry both among male immigrants and young people, while number of months during 
the rest of the past three years is only significant when all target groups are analysed together. 
 
Somewhat surprisingly, we find no effect of the local unemployment rate. This may be due to the 
limited number of municipalities that were included in the programme during of analysis period (31 in 
2003 and 45 in 2004, out of the country's 431 municipalities), and in addition the labour market 
conditions were fairly stable at the time. Altogether this probably implies that there is little variation in 
the local unemployment rate. The indicator for densely populated area is also meant to pick up local 
labour market conditions. Here there is a significant effect among male long-term social security 
recipients indicating that their chances of becoming employed are poorer if they live in a densely 
populated area. Assuming that there are more job openings in densely populated areas, this may also 
seem surprising. But if personal follow-up during programme participation is more decisive for the 
success of this target group, this may be more prevalent in tight-knit smaller communities than in 
larger residential areas. In addition there may be a larger proportion with drug addict problems among 
social security recipients in cities and more populated places. Unfortunately, we cannot explore these 
hypotheses further with the available data.  
 
The last covariate in Table 3, time since programme entry, is process time. It is measured in months 
and collapsed into intervals of three months except for the last interval, which is six months. In 
correspondence with the survival curves in Figure 1, the employment rates are estimated to be highest 
the first few months, and over the next months the rates fall fairly rapidly at first and then more 
gradually. Even if the model controls for a lot of observable characteristics, the slope may be 
influenced by other factors that we are not able to observe. Models that control for unobserved 
heterogeneity may partly rectify this, but as we are mainly occupied with the effects of various 
explanatory factors, and not so much with the time dependence of the baseline employment hazard, we 
have not applied such models here. 
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Table 3.  Transitions to employment among participants. Odds ratios1 estimated from propor-
tional hazard regression. All participants and by target group 
 All target groups Immigrants Youth Long-time social security recipients 
 All Men Women Men Women 
Single 
parents 
(both  
sexes) Men Women Men Women 
Target group 
(ref=long-term 
welfare recipients) 
          
  Immigrants 1,130 1,146 1,063        
  Single mothers 1,108 1,428 0,993        
  Youth 1,004 0,979 0,994        
Woman 0,989     0,739     
Age (years) 1,017 1,029 0,979 1,065 1,079 0,955 4,260 1,415 0,961 0,857 
Age squared /10 0,995 0,994 0,999 0,989 0,986 1,005 0,723 0,928 1,001 1,014 
Social background 
(ref=high.) 
          
  Medium 0,959 0,979 0,909 1,855 0,270 1,030 0,973 0,804 0,938 1,290 
  Low 0,913 0,862 0,976 1,646 1,373 1,033 0,866 0,840 0,804 1,235 
  Unknown 1,074 0,990 1,189 1,996 0,825 0,833 1,226 1,149 0,600 1,922 
Educational level 
(ref=low) 
          
  Medium 1,277 1,204 1,392 1,163 1,873 1,439 1,242 1,245 1,239 1,172 
  High  1,706 1,588 1,852 1,673 2,065 2,703 2,218 1,304 1,549 1,522 
  Unknown 1,328 1,224 1,482 0,928 1,669 1,869 0,702 1,976 1,066 0,560 
Marital status 
(ref=not married) 
          
  Married 1,212 1,250 1,125 1,090 1,057  0,835 1,233 1,285 1,472 
  Previously married 1,107 1,100 1,100 1,016 1,089  1,056 0,779 1,184 1,006 
Age of youngest 
child 
(ref=no children < 
18 years) 
          
  0-2 years 0,642 0,711 0,511 0,752 0,477 0,553 1,021 0,476 0,462 0,732 
  3-6 years 0,775 0,808 0,812 0,738 0,844 0,722 1,027 0,470 1,138 1,053 
  7-18 years 0,915 0,821 1,065 1,021 1,193 1,011 0,712 1,025 0,595 1,172 
1Coefficients in bold: significant at 5% level 
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Table 3 (cont.) 
 All target groups Immigrants Youth Long-time social security recipients 
 All Men Women Men Women 
Single 
parents 
(both 
sexes) Men Women Men Women 
Immigrant 
background 1,015 1,035 1,021   1,008 1,040 1,342 1,146 0,445 
Refugee 0,844 0,892 0,748 0,838 0,673      
Years since 
immigration    0,904 0,973      
Years since 
immigration, 
squared 
   1,035 1,005      
Log (transitional 
allowance in  1000 
NOK past 3 years) 
     1,050     
Months with 
extended child 
benefits past 3 
years 
     0,995     
Months employed 
past 3 years 1,027 1,027 1,026 1,022 1,021 1,030 1,028 1,031 1,041 1,027 
Months 
unemployed past 3 
years 
0,991 0,990 0,922 0,987 1,010 0,981 1,003 0,978 0,998 
 
0,990 
Vocationally 
disabled past 3 
years 
0,746 0,734 0,773 0,799 1,459 0,685 0,703 0,559 0,859 
 
0,891 
Months with 
welfare benefits 
past 6 months 
0,953 0,945 0,956 0,947 0,995 0,952 0,934 0,914 0,953 0,999 
Months with 
welfare benefits 
the rest of the past 
3 years 
0,994 0,993 0,996 0,997 0,999 0,989 0,992 1,006 0,989 0,998 
Log (labour 
income in 1000 
NOK last year) 
1,112 1,115 1,099 1,115 1,125 1,054 1,129 1,120 1,098 1,161 
Years with labour 
income  1,013 1,009 1,024 0,991 0,978 1,002 1,004 0,974 1,024 1,055 
Densely populated 
area 0,966 0,883 1,127 1,017 1,198 1,338 0,934 1,080 0,715 1,241 
Local 
unemployment 
rate 
1,014 1,004 1,036 1,128 1,199 0,968 0,999 0,916 0,945 1,122 
Time since 
programme entry 
(ref=1-3 months) 
          
  4-6 months 0,781 0,726 0,885 0,782 1,151 0,775 0,642 0,883 0,745 0,716 
  7-9 months 0,628 0,582 0,717 0,614 0,980 0,652 0,468 0,613 0,679 0,564 
  10-12 months 0,665 0,592 0,807 0,594 1,262 0,652 0,618 0,679 0,574 0,617 
  13-15 months 0,508 0,567 0,408 0,482 0,637 0,394 0,729 0,426 0,539 0,145 
  16-21 months 0,359 0,289 0,497 0,343 0,657 0,538 0,307 0,495 0,212 0,289 
Likelihood Ratio 1127,9 760,3 407,1 253,9 111,2 109,1 223,8 164,9 351,3 115,9 
DF 33 32 32 30 30 29 28 28 28 28 
N (person-months) 90 882 58 601 32 281 20 369 9 364 10 066 16 419 7 886 21 008 5 770 
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7.2. Evaluation of programme impact 
We now turn to the question of programme impact, by comparing the survival rates of the participants 
with the corresponding rates of the matched control group. If there is a significant difference in 
survival rates between these two groups, we may conclude that there has been a programme impact on 
transitions to employment. As explained in section 7.1, we have two definitions of success: one strict 
and one less strict, and the results for both definitions are displayed in the figures below. The average 
survival rates of all participants and controls are plotted in Figure 2 for both the strict definition (left 
panel) and the less strict definition (right panel) of employment. If we apply the strict definition, there 
is no significant difference between the treated and the control group (p > 0,34). However, if we apply 
the less strict definition, then there is a positive treatment effect (p < 0.01). For the participants, it 
takes 10 months before the first 25 per cent get a job, compared to 11 months for the controls. Hence, 
the transition rate is slightly higher for participants than for non-participants.  
 
Figure 2.  Transitions to employment among all participants and matched control group. Em-
ployment defined strictly and less strictly. 
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As the average effect might differ across subpopulations, we also need to consider each target group 
separately. The survival rates for each group are plotted in Figure 3-6. Considering immigrants, the 
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transition rate to employment seems to be slightly higher for the treated group, but this difference is 
not significant. Still, when applying the less strict definition of employment, the p-value is fairly small 
(p=0.0825), which suggests that there might be a very small positive effect if we are willing to accept 
this definition of success.  
 
Figure 3.  Transitions to employment among immigrant participants and matched control 
group. Employment defined strictly and less strictly.  
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Figure 4.  Transitions to employment among single parent participants and matched control 
group. Employment defined strictly and less strictly.  
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Figure 5. Transitions to employment among youth participants and matched control group. 
Employment defined strictly and less strictly.  
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Figure 6. Transitions to employment among long-term social security recipient participants and 
matched control group. Employment defined strictly and less strictly.  
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For single parents, there is no effect whatsoever, as the survival rate is almost the same for the treated 
and the controls. Whether we apply a strict or a less strict definition of employment does not affect 
this result. A perhaps more surprising result is that the effect for youth is statistically significant, but 
not in the desired direction. The survival rate for the treated group is higher than for the control group, 
implying that treatment have a counterproductive impact on this group. This applies to both the less 
strict and the strict job definition, but only the latter is statistically significant (p<0.01). For the treated, 
it takes 11 months before the first 25 per cent get a job, compared to 10 months for the controls. The 
finding of no programme effects among youth is in line with other studies (Larsson 2002, Hardoy 
2005), but in our case, there may also be some methodological issues involved. In the matching 
procedure we use the persons' past three years history as covariates. If we assume that the participants 
have some unobservable latent traits that are highly correlated with their history of employment and 
receipt of social security, the time may have been too short for these traits to be manifested in their 
recorded history and may not be visible until later in life. In other words, for youth, the matching 
procedure may not be as good as for the older groups because of the shorter history of the former.  
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The largest program effect appears among other long-term social security recipients, and the effect is 
highly significant for both the strict and the less strict definition of employment. For participants, it 
takes 15 months before the first 25 per cent get a job, compared to more than 21 months (i.e. longer 
than the observation window) for the controls when applying the strict definition (p<0.0001). When 
applying the less strict definition, the difference increases, and the comparable estimates are 11 
months for the treated and 20 months for the controls.  
8. Summary and conclusion 
In this paper we have examined the short-run effects of a vocational rehabilitation programme directed 
at particularly disadvantaged groups in Norway. The initiative is part of the Norwegian government's 
Action Plan to Combat Poverty, which was launched in 2003. The main intention is to make people 
economically independent, but because these groups are particularly disadvantaged on the labour 
market, the short-term goal for them is to get a regular job.  
 
The programme has a focus on four target groups whose main source of income is social security 
benefits: long-term welfare recipients, single parents, youth and immigrants. Immigrants may be 
allowed even if they do not receive benefits as long as they are believed to need special assistance to 
get a job. In a number of municipalities, these groups have been offered work programmes in 
combination with a closer collaboration between the social services and the labour market services. 
The target groups thus receive more support than just work initiatives - also the combined effect of a 
more tight-knit collaboration between these services. We are here evaluating the joint impact of these 
efforts. Our research strategy is twofold: We adopt a quasi-experimental design to estimate the mean 
effect for the participants, and use a multivariate hazard rate model to investigate the determinants of 
the process to a first job. The latter gives insight into which individual characteristics are associated 
with a higher employment probability, while the former allows us to estimate the programme effect by 
constructing a reasonable control group, and thus eliminating the effect of selection bias into the work 
programmes. As the impact may be heterogeneous across target groups, we have conducted separate 
analyses for each group.  
 
We find that the mean programme impact across all target groups is positive, but only when work is 
defined fairly broadly. When employment is defined more strictly, there is no statistically significant 
effect. However, the impact varies by target group. There is no impact for immigrants or single 
mothers no matter how employment is defined. For the youth group, there seems to be a small, 
significant counterproductive effect, implying that they would have been better off without this 
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particular programme. The only significant effect in the desired direction is found among long-term 
social security recipients. This finding is statistically significant and applies for both the strict and the 
less strict definition of employment. Moreover, the effect is fairly large.  
 
When not controlling for individual characteristics, the mean transition rate varies by target group, 
which would imply that the employment chances of the various target groups differ. However, when 
controlling for individual characteristics, the differences between the target groups disappear. This 
implies that the mean differences between groups are composition effects. The characteristics that are 
most important are their prior work- and welfare histories, and the effects are as expected: more 
employment experience is associated with a higher transition rate to employment. Correspondingly, a 
longer history of social security dependence is associated with a lower transition rate to employment. 
The effects are largely similar across target groups and gender, suggesting that the employment 
chances are determined by more or less the same factors in all subgroups. 
 
An important point to consider is why the initiative has a positive impact on long-term social security 
recipients, but not on other groups. A study of the implementation of the initiative conducted in 
parallel and in collaboration with our study, suggests that the positive effect is caused by the tighter 
collaboration between the welfare services and employment services. This leads to a better 
understanding of each other's work and the needs of their mutual clients. Previously, the employment 
services tended to view clients from the social security services as unemployable, as these clients are 
particularly disadvantaged, and it takes more effort to find them a job. However, the employment 
services are now granted extra money, and also get more assistance through the collaboration with the 
social security services. Employment efforts directed at this group are then no longer at the expense of 
other unemployed clients. This has resulted in more and better services towards long-term social 
security recipients (Schafft and Spjelkavik 2006: 104).  
 
But why did not this have the same positive impact on other target groups? Could it be that the 
positive gains from a tighter collaboration did not affect these groups? Considering youth, one 
explanation could be that the matching procedure did not work as well for this group as for the other 
groups. As previous welfare- and employment history are the most important determinants for both 
participation and outcome, many of these youths are too young to have had much past history. There 
may thus be some unobserved characteristics that are not yet manifested through their history. Even 
though the groups are equal on all observable characteristics, this may imply that the treated group is 
more disadvantaged than the control group, and that the estimate of programme effect therefore is 
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negatively biased. Another possibility is that the threat of having the benefits cut if one is not willing 
to enter the activation programme, is a strong incentive to find a job, which could result in more easily 
employable persons in the control group. This applies to all target groups, but may be more so for 
youth as they do not have a long history of marginalisation (at least not yet). On the other hand, other 
studies have also found that employment programmes are likely to counterproductive for youth 
(Calmfors et. al. 2001, Larsson 2002, Hardoy 2005), and this could be the case despite the positive 
gains of collaboration between the services. Whether this particular programme has increased or 
decreased this counterproductive effect is therefore uncertain.  
 
It is possible that the target groups are likely to be offered different kinds of work initiatives, and that 
the difference in impact is due to the fact that different types of measures have different effects (see 
Dahl and Lorentzen 2005). It is e.g. likely that the immigrant group to a larger extent are offered 
courses that will improve their skills in the Norwegian language, or in other ways increase their social 
and cultural capital. If so, this may not have much of an effect in the short run, but may show better 
results in the future. Considering single parents, about 50 per cent have children under school age, and 
this may be one reason for a lack of impact in this group. It could be that caring for small children and 
the expenses for childcare are prohibitive, and in that case, even work programmes of this kind is not 
likely to be of much help. Our data cannot be used to investigate these assumptions, and other kinds of 
studies are needed to pursue such issues.  
 
As the maximum observation period of our study is only 21 months, we have only been able to 
evaluate short-term effects. There is therefore a need for studies that follow the participants over a 
longer period. A particularly important aspect to investigate in the future is whether and to what extent 
those who got a job are able to keep it for a longer period. Taking the duration of jobs into account 
may alter the estimated impact, as the effects may be more long lasting in some target groups than in 
others. When analysing data over a longer time period, it will also be possible to assess the effect on 
poverty, analysing earnings and dependency on welfare benefits after the participants exit from the 
work programmes. For the youth group, we should also consider to what extent they return to 
education and thus increase their human and cultural capital, which might prove more beneficial in the 
long run.  
 
So far, the short-term evaluation has proved the initiative directed towards these four target groups to 
be successful only for long-term welfare participants, and not for the other three target groups. From 
the multivariate analysis it is also interesting to see that the same characteristics seem to have similar 
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effects across target groups. It is therefore puzzling that the impact varies between target groups. 
Future research should dig deeper into the reasons for these differences.  
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Appendix 
Table A1.  Descriptive statistics and test for balance. Participants and controls. Men, target 
group immigrants. Mean and per cent 
 1st April 2003 1st January 2004 1st July 2004 
 
Partici-
pants Control 
Ad-
justed 
bias
P-value
(t-test)
Partici-
pants Control
Ad-
justed 
bias
P-value
(t-test)
Partici-
pants Control 
Ad- 
just-ed 
bias 
P-value
(t-test)
Age (years) 33,96 34,23 -2,7 0,5 34,42 34,78 -3,5 0,6 35,00 34,76 2,2 0,7
Social background (per cent)      
  High  1 1 1 1 2 2  
  Medium 4 3 4,5 0,3 5 4 5,1 0,4 4 3 5,1 0,4
  Low 2 2 -0,7 0,9 3 2 4,0 0,5 3 2 5,8 0,4
  Unknown 94 95 -4,4 0,3 91 92 -5,3 0,4 91 93 -8,4 0,2
Educational level (per cent)      
  Low 9 8 12 12 12 12  
  Medium 41 43 -5,6 0,2 41 39 4,9 0,4 40 41 -0,5 0,9
  High  9 9 0,6 0,9 9 9 0,0 1,0 8 9 -3 0,6
  Unknown 41 40 2,9 0,5 37 39 -4,5 0,5 39 38 1,4 0,8
Age youngest child (per cent)      
  0-2 years 12 11 12 12 13 15  
  3-6 years 11 9 5 0,2 10 9 3,9 0,5 13 14 -2,1 0,8
  7-18 years 12 14 -5,1 0,2 14 16 -5,7 0,4 13 12 2 0,8
  No child < 18 years 65 66 -1,1 0,8 64 64 1,3 0,8 61 59 4,7 0,5
Marital status (per cent)       
  Unmarried 34 32 37 38 34 29  
  Married 51 52 -2,3 0,6 47 46 2,0 0,8 50 53 -6,8 0,3
  Previously married 15 16 -2,8 0,5 16 16 0,0 1,0 16 18 -3,2 0,7
Time since last welfare benefit 
payment (per cent)      
  Receives now 61 62 64 65 65 64  
  1-6 months 15 15 1,1 0,8 15 14 4,2 0,5 15 15 -0,7 0,9
  7-24 months 3 2 2,4 0,5 3 2 6,4 0,2 3 4 -3,6 0,6
  25 - 36 months 13 13 0,7 0,9 12 12 0,0 1,0 11 11 -1,2 0,8
  > 36 months 7 8 -1,6 0,6 5 7 -3,2 0,4 6 6 1,2 0,8
Refugee (per cent) 80 80 -0,4 0,9 78 77 2,6 0,7 76 77 -1 0,9
Years since immigration  8,01 8,03 -0,2 1,0 8,43 8,35 1,2 0,8 8,45 8,19 3,7 0,6
Months unemployed  8,72 8,72 0 1,0 9,13 9,47 -3,9 0,6 8,77 9,23 -5,3 0,5
Vocationally disabled past 3 years 
(per cent) 0,26 0,25 2,5 0,5 0,26 0,24 2,4 0,7 0,26 0,23 3,8 0,5
Months employed past 3 years 5,57 5,26 3,3 0,3 5,65 6,07 -4,6 0,4 5,44 5,79 -3,7 0,5
Months since last employment 
(past 3 years) 23,28 23,35 -0,5 0,9 23,51 22,50 7,4 0,2 25,24 24,43 6 0,4
Months with welfare benefits past 
6 months 3,59 3,62 -1,2 0,8 3,59 3,56 1,2 0,9 3,52 3,49 1,3 0,9
Months with welfare benefits the 
rest of the past 3 years 12,91 12,97 -0,6 0,9 12,96 12,77 2,0 0,8 12,65 12,27 4 0,6
Years with labour income 2,65 2,78 -2,3 0,5 2,58 2,73 -3,0 0,6 2,78 3,00 -4,4 0,5
Income from labour last year 
(in 1 000 NOK) 35,37 37,40 -2,3 0,5 33,51 33,15 0,6 0,9 36,36 44,71 -9,9 0,1
Local unemployment rate  3,76 3,77 -1 0,8 4,37 4,36 1,0 0,9 4,28 4,25 3,4 0,6
Densely populated area (per cent) 95 96 -2,8 0,4 98 97 4,8 0,3 95 95 -1,7 0,8
Source: FD-Trygd, Statistics Norway. 
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Table A2.  Descriptive statistics and test for balance. Participants and controls. Women, target 
group immigrants. Mean and per cent 
 1st April 2003 1st January 2004 1st July 2004 
 
Partici-
pants Control 
Ad-
justed 
bias
P-value
(t-test)
Partici-
pants Control
Ad-
justed 
bias
P-value
(t-test)
Partici-
pants Control 
Ad- 
just-ed 
bias 
P-value
(t-test)
Age (years) 33,44 33,41 0,4 0,9 31,52 31,78 -2,8 0,8 32,08 31,86 2,4 0,8
Social background (per cent)      
  High  1 1   6 7   2 2   
  Medium 2 1 2,4 0,6     2 1 7,9 0,3
  Low 1 1 4 0,4 3 1 13,1 0,2 5 5 -3,1 0,8
  Unknown 96 97 -4,1 0,4 94 92 -5 0,7 92 92 -2,3 0,8
Educational level (per cent)      
  Low 13 12   18 18   8 6   
  Medium 31 32 -1,8 0,8 31 29 4,2 0,7 40 41 -2,5 0,8
  High  8 6 6,4 0,2 4 4 0 1,0 5 4 2,2 0,8
  Unknown 48 50 -3,1 0,6 47 49 -3,8 0,7 48 49 -3,5 0,7
Age youngest child (per cent)      
  0-2 years 12 13   9 10   16 18   
  3-6 years 22 26 -7,7 0,2 20 15 11,3 0,3 20 23 -5,8 0,6
  7-18 years 21 21 0,4 0,9 20 21 -3,2 0,8 22 20 2,9 0,8
  No child < 18 years 44 40 7,5 0,2 52 54 -3,8 0,7 42 39 5,9 0,6
Marital status (per cent)       
  Unmarried 19 16   32 35   27 29   
  Married 72 76 -8,4 0,1 57 53 8,2 0,5 64 63 1,2 0,9
  Previously married 9 8 3,2 0,6 11 12 -2,3 0,9 9 8 4,5 0,7
Time since last welfare benefit 
payment (per cent)      
  Receives now 24 22   34 32   34 34   
  1-6 months 8 7 4,5 0,5 15 17 -9,1 0,5 7 9 -7,8 0,5
  7-24 months 2 3 -5,3 0,4 1 1 -6,3 0,6 5 5 0 1,0
  25 - 36 months 13 15 -3,9 0,5 17 15 5,3 0,6 22 19 7,7 0,5
  > 36 months 53 53 -1,8 0,8 33 34 -2,8 0,8 33 34 -2,6 0,8
Refugee (per cent) 49 49 1 0,9 62 61 2,6 0,8 64 67 -7,3 0,5
Years since immigration  7,23 7,00 3,2 0,5 7,13 7,06 1,4 0,9 7,15 7,10 0,8 0,9
Months unemployed  5,07 4,49 8,7 0,2 5,58 5,13 6,6 0,6 5,26 5,01 4 0,7
Vocationally disabled past 3 years 
(per cent) 0,13 0,13 0 1,0 0,11 0,15 -8,7 0,5 0,09 0,10 -3 0,8
Months employed past 3 years 4,27 4,00 3 0,5 4,45 3,93 6 0,5 4,63 5,66 -11,6 0,2
Months since last employment 
(past 3 years) 26,97 27,21 -1,7 0,8 25,71 25,43 2 0,9 25,41 24,41 7,1 0,5
Months with welfare benefits past 
6 months 1,38 1,26 6,4 0,4 2,01 2,03 -1,3 0,9 1,67 1,59 4,4 0,7
Months with welfare benefits the 
rest of the past 3 years 4,77 4,52 3,5 0,6 6,59 6,63 -0,6 1,0 6,59 6,73 -1,8 0,9
Years with labour income 1,37 1,16 5,6 0,1 0,94 0,94 0,3 1,0 0,70 0,77 -3,1 0,7
Income from labour last year 
(in 1 000 NOK) 24,02 22,39 2,3 0,6 26,43 25,50 1,4 0,9 21,57 23,74 -3,6 0,7
Local unemployment rate  3,75 3,75 0,4 0,9 4,38 4,42 -4,9 0,6 4,18 4,20 -2,3 0,8
Densely populated area (per cent) 95 96 -3,1 0,5 94 93 1,9 0,8 92 92 1,9 0,8
Source: FD-Trygd, Statistics Norway. 
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Tabell A3. Descriptive statistics and test for balance. Participants and controls. Target group 
lone parents. Mean and per cent 
 1st April 2003 1st January 2004 1st July 2004 
 
Partici-
pants Control 
Ad-
justed 
bias
P-value
(t-test)
Partici-
pants Control
Ad-
justed 
bias
P-value
(t-test)
Partici-
pants Control 
Ad- 
just-ed 
bias 
P-value
(t-test)
Women (per cent) 92 93 89 90 94 92  
Immigrant background (per cent) 30 32 -4,7 0,5 29 33 -10,2 0,3 32 35 -5,8 0,6
Age (years) 32,69 31,91 10 0,1 32,62 32,68 -0,8 0,9 33,71 33,77 -0,8 0,9
Social background (per cent)      
  High 7 6 5 5 4 4  
  Medium 37 40 -4,8 0,4 39 36 7,1 0,4 43 40 6,0 0,5
  Low 25 23 4,2 0,5 26 25 2,0 0,8 21 22 -3,1 0,7
  Unknown 31 32 -2,1 0,7 30 34 -11,3 0,3 32 34 -3,9 0,7
Educational level (per cent)      
  Low 21 21 22 20 19 16  
  Medium 62 61 2,3 0,7 66 63 4,7 0,6 64 64 0,0 1,0
  High 7 7 1,4 0,8 4 6 -5,5 0,5 7 8 -3,3 0,7
  Unknown 9 11 -4,1 0,5 8 11 -12,0 0,3 11 13 -7,6 0,5
Age youngest child (per cent)      
  0-2 years 5 5 4 4 5 5  
  3-6 years 40 44 -9,5 0,1 41 44 -4,5 0,6 88 89 -2,3 0,8
  7-18 years 50 46 8,4 0,2 47 44 7,1 0,5    
  No child < 18 years 5 5 1,6 0,8 8 9 -5,3 0,6 7 6 5,2 0,6
Time since last welfare benefit 
payment (per cent))      
  Receives now 57 57 65 66 63 62  
  1-6 months 22 23 -1,3 0,8 19 20 -3,3 0,7 17 18 -2,1 0,8
  7-24 months 4 3 5,3 0,2 3 2 3,3 0,6 3 3 0,0 1,0
  25-36 months 14 17 -5,1 0,3 12 11 2,1 0,8 14 14 1,0 0,9
  > 36 months 1 1 4 0,2 1 1 0,0 1,0 2 3 -2,2 0,8
Months unemployed  9,11 8,95 2 0,8 10,01 10,34 -4,0 0,7 9,31 9,52 -2,7 0,8
Vocationally disabled past 3 years 
(per cent) 0,25 0,17 9,8 0,0 0,26 0,26 0,0 1,0 0,26 0,25 1,1 0,9
Months employed past 3 years 5,34 5,79 -4,9 0,4 5,73 4,66 11,7 0,2 4,09 4,30 -2,4 0,8
Months since last employment 
(past 3 years) 24,89 24,74 1,1 0,9 24,49 25,82 -9,8 0,3 27,15 26,76 3,0 0,7
Months with welfare benefits past 
6 months 3,27 3,21 3,1 0,7 3,36 3,43 -3,7 0,7 3,36 3,41 -2,3 0,8
Months with welfare benefits the 
rest of the past 3 years 9,83 9,63 2,5 0,7 10,18 10,26 -1,0 0,9 10,25 9,99 3,1 0,8
Years with labour income 3,81 3,56 4,3 0,4 3,81 3,42 6,9 0,4 3,92 3,98 -1,2 0,9
Income from labour last year 
(in 1 000 NOK) 
25,62 26,15 -0,8 0,9 25,34 24,50 1,5 0,9 20,40 22,83 -4,2 0,6
Local unemployment rate  3,80 3,78 3,1 0,6 4,24 4,22 1,8 0,8 4,29 4,29 0,7 0,9
Densely populated area (per cent) 94 95 -2,9 0,5 94 95 -2,8 0,7 94 93 2,7 0,7
Months with extended child 
benefits past 3 years 10,51 10,49 0,7 0,9 10,49 10,33 5,5 0,6 10,29 10,07 7,0 0,4
Months since last extended child 
benefit payment 0,67 0,74 -3,4 0,6 0,67 0,73 -2,8 0,8 0,81 0,72 3,9 0,7
Transitional allowance in 1 000 
NOK 112,95 118,91 -6,3 0,3 105,65 105,35 0,3 1,0 114,41 116,84 -2,3 0,8
Source: FD-Trygd, Statistics Norway. 
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Tabell A4. Descriptive statistics and test for balance. Participants and controls. Men, target 
group youth. Mean and per cent 
 1st April 2003 1st January 2004 1st July 2004 
 
Partici-
pants Control 
Ad-
justed 
bias
P-value
(t-test)
Partici-
pants Control
Ad-
justed 
bias
P-value
(t-test)
Partici-
pants Control 
Ad- 
just-ed 
bias 
P-value
(t-test)
Immigrant background (per cent) 8 7 2,6 0,5 9 7 4,4 0,4 14 14 1,9 0,8
Social background (per cent)      
  High  15 14 18 16 19 18  
  Medium 65 66 -2,0 0,7 64 66 -3,9 0,5 66 71 -9,0 0,2
  Low 14 15 -3,8 0,5 12 12 0,0 1,0 10 8 5,3 0,4
  Unknown 6 5 6,8 0,2 6 7 -0,9 0,9 6 4 8,2 0,3
Educational level (per cent)      
  Low 35 34 28 27 28 29  
  Medium or higher 65 66 -1,0 0,8 72 73 -1,3 0,8 72 71 4,1 0,5
Age youngest child (per cent)      
  0-2 years 1 2 2 2 1 0  
  3-6 years 4 5 -5,2 0,3 4 3 6,2 0,3 4 4 -2,5 0,7
  7-18 years 21 19 3,6 0,4 17 17 -0,9 0,9 28 29 -2,0 0,8
  No child < 18 years 74 75 -0,8 0,9 77 78 -1,7 0,8 67 66 1,9 0,8
Marital status (per cent)       
  Unmarried 99 99 99 99 98 98  
  Married 1 1 2,4 0,6 1 1 -2,0 0,8 1 0 6,8 0,3
  Previously married 0 0 0,0 1,0 0 0 0,0 1,0 0 1 -12,8 0,3
Time since last welfare benefit 
payment (per cent)      
  Receives now 51 51 54 51 47 46  
  1-6 months 18 18 0,0 1,0 16 20 -11,4 0,1 21 20 1,8 0,8
  7-24 months 6 6 1,6 0,7 6 7 -7,5 0,3 5 6 -4,9 0,5
  25 - 36 months 21 22 -2,5 0,6 20 20 -0,9 0,9 22 24 -5,0 0,5
  > 36 months 5 3 4,3 0,1 5 2 7,6 0,0 5 4 3,7 0,3
Age (years) 20,46 20,49 -1,8 0,7 20,86 20,84 1,0 0,8 20,24 20,22 1,1 0,8
Months unemployed  6,92 6,74 3,1 0,6 6,60 6,31 5,1 0,4 6,39 6,13 4,3 0,6
Vocationally disabled past 3 years 
(per cent) 0,46 0,47 -1,3 0,8 0,38 0,40 -2,6 0,7 0,38 0,36 3,0 0,7
Months employed past 3 years 6,68 6,83 -1,6 0,7 7,12 7,45 -3,8 0,5 6,19 6,24 -0,6 0,9
Months since last employment 
(past 3 years) 22,06 21,66 2,8 0,6 21,14 21,88 -5,4 0,4 22,02 21,53 3,5 0,6
Months with welfare benefits past 
6 months 2,64 2,67 -1,4 0,8 2,47 2,46 0,5 0,9 2,38 2,30 3,8 0,6
Months with welfare benefits the 
rest of the past 3 years 7,38 7,39 -0,1 1,0 6,11 6,36 -3,6 0,6 5,77 5,85 -1,3 0,9
Years with labour income 0,80 0,83 -2,1 0,7 0,67 0,61 5,1 0,4 0,51 0,50 0,6 0,9
Income from labour last year 
(in 1 000 NOK) 29,14 30,02 -1,7 0,7 29,60 31,68 -4,5 0,4 26,44 26,88 -0,9 0,9
Local unemployment rate  3,80 3,77 3,1 0,6 4,27 4,22 5,6 0,4 4,19 4,15 4,6 0,5
Densely populated area (per cent) 87 89 -4,4 0,3 88 88 0,5 0,9 88 86 5,8 0,4
Source: FD-Trygd, Statistics Norway. 
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Tabell A5. Descriptive statistics and test for balance. Participants and controls. Women, target 
group youth. Mean and per cent 
 1st April 2003 1st January 2004 1st July 2004 
 
Partici-
pants Control 
Ad-
justed 
bias
P-value
(t-test)
Partici-
pants Control
Ad-
justed 
bias
P-value
(t-test)
Partici-
pants Control 
Ad- 
just-ed 
bias 
P-value
(t-test)
Immigrant background (per cent) 8 8 0,0 1,0 6 6 1,3 0,84 7 5 6,3 0,4
Social background (per cent)      
  High  14 12 12 12 18 22  
  Medium 67 72 -10,9 0,1 67 68 -0,9 0,92 62 59 7,3 0,5
  Low 14 11 9,2 0,2 16 17 -2,6 0,80 13 15 -6,4 0,6
  Unknown 5 5 -1,2 0,9 4 3 4,9 0,63 7 4 12,5 0,3
Educational level (per cent)      
  Low 24 23 24 24 26 24  
  Medium or higher 76 77 -2,6 0,7 76 76 0,0 1,00 74 76 -3,6 0,7
Age youngest child (per cent)      
  0-2 years 4 5 4 4 3 2  
  3-6 years 5 4 4,1 0,5 4 3 4,3 0,61 3 3 0,0 1,0
  7-18 years 18 16 5,2 0,4 14 10 9,3 0,20 23 26 -5,8 0,6
  No child < 18 years 73 76 -5,3 0,4 78 82 -9,4 0,25 71 70 3,2 0,7
Marital status (per cent)       
  Unmarried 94 94 96 94 95 96  
  Married 5 5 -2,3 0,8 4 6 -8,9 0,38 3 3 2,8 0,8
  Previously married 1 1 -2,7 0,8 0 0 0,0 1,00 2 1 5,3 0,7
Time since last welfare benefit 
payment (per cent)      
  Receives now 52 51 55 53 40 43  
  1-6 months 18 19 -4,1 0,6 19 21 -3,6 0,73 20 21 -1,4 0,9
  7-24 months 4 5 -2,2 0,7 4 4 0,0 1,00 5 5 0,0 1,0
  25 - 36 months 20 23 -5,8 0,4 16 19 -7,6 0,40 27 26 2,4 0,8
  > 36 months 5 3 7,1 0,0 5 3 5,6 0,22 8 6 5,1 0,4
Age (years) 20,24 20,31 -3,5 0,5 20,15 20,14 0,5 0,96 19,76 19,63 7,4 0,4
Months unemployed  5,82 5,57 5,1 0,5 5,51 5,25 5,2 0,64 4,66 4,23 8,7 0,4
Vocationally disabled past 3 years 
(per cent) 0,25 0,27 -3,8 0,6 0,15 0,17 -5,2 0,61 0,18 0,16 3,2 0,7
Months employed past 3 years 8,15 8,23 -0,8 0,9 8,61 8,44 1,8 0,85 8,10 7,86 2,4 0,8
Months since last employment 
(past 3 years) 18,80 18,98 -1,2 0,9 18,72 18,77 -0,4 0,97 20,31 19,61 4,9 0,6
Months with welfare benefits past 
6 months 2,74 2,69 2,5 0,8 2,52 2,66 -7,3 0,49 2,24 2,40 -7,7 0,5
Months with welfare benefits the 
rest of the past 3 years 6,51 6,36 2,3 0,8 5,82 6,41 -8,8 0,44 4,53 4,80 -4,3 0,7
Years with labour income 0,74 0,73 0,6 0,9 0,41 0,38 4,3 0,60 0,41 0,36 4,7 0,6
Income from labour last year 
(in 1 000 NOK) 32,94 36,66 -8,0 0,2 25,94 25,97 -0,1 0,99 24,81 21,56 7,9 0,4
Local unemployment rate  3,70 3,68 2,2 0,7 4,09 4,21 -11,8 0,21 4,03 4,06 -2,9 0,8
Densely populated area (per cent) 87 84 8,8 0,2 86 88 -3,5 0,68 84 82 5,4 0,6
Source: FD-Trygd, Statistics Norway. 
 
41 
Tabell A6. Descriptive statistics and test for balance. Participants and controls. Men, target 
group long-term social security recipients. Mean and per cent 
 1st April 2003 1st January 2004 1st July 2004 
 
Partici-
pants Control 
Ad-
justed 
bias
P-value
(t-test)
Partici-
pants Control
Ad-
justed 
bias
P-value
(t-test)
Partici-
pants Control 
Ad- 
just-ed 
bias 
P-value
(t-test)
Immigrant background (per cent) 2 3 -4,8 0,3 2 1 7,4 0,1 2 2 0,0 1,0
Social background (per cent)      
  High  12 12 16 16 17 18  
  Medium 54 57 -7,4 0,1 51 49 4,5 0,5 56 52 7,9 0,2
  Low 28 26 4,6 0,3 26 29 -5,0 0,4 21 23 -4,6 0,5
  Unknown 6 5 5,4 0,2 7 6 2,4 0,7 6 7 -1,9 0,8
Educational level (per cent)      
  Low 18 17 18 17 19 18  
  Medium 71 73 -3,0 0,5 71 72 -0,8 0,9 71 71 -1,0 0,9
  High 9 9 -1,8 0,7 7 8 -2,5 0,7 8 8 0,0 1,0
  Unknown 2 1 4,5 0,3 3 3 0,0 1,0 2 3 -10,5 0,2
Age youngest child (per cent)      
  0-2 years 3 3 2 2 2 2  
  3-6 years 2 1 1,0 0,7 2 3 -4,1 0,4 2 1 2,5 0,6
  7-18 years 3 4 -2,5 0,5 4 5 -4,1 0,5 4 4 -1,0 0,9
  No child < 18 years 92 92 1,1 0,8 92 90 4,6 0,4 92 92 -1,4 0,8
Marital status (per cent)       
  Unmarried 81 81 79 77 81 84  
  Married 5 4 1,6 0,6 4 4 -1,3 0,8 4 3 5,5 0,2
  Previously married 14 14 -0,7 0,9 18 19 -3,5 0,6 15 13 4,2 0,5
Time since last welfare benefit 
payment (per cent)      
  Receives now 66 66 69 69 66 67  
  1-6 months 16 17 -2,7 0,5 14 15 -1,5 0,8 19 17 5,1 0,4
  7-24 months 4 4 -0,4 0,9 4 6 -5,9 0,3 3 2 2,9 0,5
  25 - 36 months 12 12 -0,7 0,8 11 9 3,3 0,5 11 11 -1,1 0,8
  > 36 months 1 1 2,5 0,2 1 1 1,4 0,6 2 3 -3,3 0,4
Age (years) 34,93 34,87 0,7 0,9 35,39 36,09 -7,2 0,2 34,94 34,61 3,5 0,6
Months unemployed  13,42 13,57 -1,6 0,7 12,43 12,71 -3,0 0,7 12,32 11,87 4,7 0,5
Vocationally disabled past 3 years 
(per cent) 0,58 0,58 0,4 0,9 0,54 0,50 4,4 0,4 0,59 0,56 2,8 0,7
Months employed past 3 years 5,29 5,33 -0,4 0,9 5,86 6,21 -3,7 0,5 5,08 5,16 -0,8 0,9
Months since last employment 
(past 3 years) 25,07 24,92 1,1 0,8 25,15 24,87 2,1 0,7 26,23 26,59 -2,8 0,7
Months with welfare benefits past 
6 months 3,70 3,65 2,4 0,6 3,51 3,46 2,5 0,7 3,73 3,75 -0,9 0,9
Months with welfare benefits the 
rest of the past 3 years 13,44 13,18 2,6 0,6 11,55 11,83 -2,8 0,7 12,05 12,52 -4,7 0,5
Years with labour income 9,88 10,03 -1,6 0,7 10,38 11,13 -7,9 0,2 9,90 9,28 6,8 0,3
Income from labour last year 
(in 1 000 NOK) 38,13 38,29 -0,2 1,0 35,73 34,48 1,4 0,7 34,79 32,67 2,4 0,6
Local unemployment rate  3,86 3,82 4,0 0,4 4,35 4,31 4,1 0,5 4,25 4,23 2,5 0,7
Densely populated area (per cent) 90 92 -4,1 0,2 89 91 -4,1 0,4 89 93 -11,3 0,0
Source: FD-Trygd, Statistics Norway. 
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Tabell A7. Descriptive statistics and test for balance. Participants and controls. Women, target 
group long-term social security recipients. Mean and per cent 
 1st April 2003 1st January 2004 1st July 2004 
 
Partici-
pants Control 
Ad-
justed 
bias
P-value
(t-test)
Partici-
pants Control
Ad-
justed 
bias
P-value
(t-test)
Partici-
pants Control 
Ad- 
just-ed 
bias 
P-value
(t-test)
Immigrant background (per cent) 4 5 -5,2 0,6 1 1 0,0 1,0 3 2 8,7 0,4
Social background (per cent)      
  High 13 15 16 11 9 6  
  Medium 47 52 -10,6 0,2 52 55 -6,3 0,6 60 62 -3,4 0,8
  Low 28 22 11,8 0,1 20 20 1,5 0,9 22 25 -5,9 0,6
  Unknown 13 11 5,1 0,5 12 14 -6,5 0,6 8 8 3,2 0,8
Educational level (per cent)      
  Low 20 21 16 20 15 16  
  Medium 66 66 1,4 0,9 68 62 12,0 0,3 70 72 -3,6 0,8
  High  11 11 0,0 1,0 15 16 -5,0 0,6 11 8 7,3 0,5
  Unknown 2 2 2,5 0,8 5 1 5,3 0,7 3 3 0,0 1,0
Age youngest child (per cent)      
  0-2 years 4 4 6 4 3 1  
  3-6 years 13 14 -1,0 0,9 8 8 2,1 0,8 10 10 0,0 1,0
  7-18 years 9 8 4,3 0,6 7 9 -8,3 0,4 7 8 -5,7 0,6
  No child < 18 years 74 74 -1,5 0,9 79 79 0,0 1,0 81 81 0,0 1,0
Marital status (per cent)       
  Unmarried 68 67 64 68 64 62  
  Married 12 14 -4,2 0,5 12 10 4,8 0,6 14 14 2,1 0,9
  Previously married 20 19 0,8 0,9 24 22 4,7 0,7 22 25 -6,2 0,6
Time since last welfare benefit 
payment (per cent)      
  Receives now 58 62 61 59 69 70  
  1-6 months 18 15 7,3 0,4 12 12 0,0 1,0 18 15 7,0 0,6
  7-24 months 2 2 3,0 0,6 4 3 2,8 0,8 3 2 3,9 0,7
  25 - 36 months 15 15 0,8 0,9 15 18 -6,0 0,5 9 12 -6,4 0,5
  > 36 months 7 7 0,0 1,0 8 8 -1,7 0,8 2 1 2,7 0,6
Age (years) 34,77 34,09 6,8 0,4 33,99 33,23 7,9 0,5 33,68 34,68 -10,7 0,4
Months unemployed  10,62 9,72 11,1 0,3 8,33 8,46 -1,8 0,9 9,97 9,96 0,1 1,0
Vocationally disabled past 3 years 
(per cent) 0,26 0,25 2,2 0,8 0,56 0,66 11,1 0,3 0,61 0,54 7,2 0,6
Months employed past 3 years 6,43 6,68 -2,4 0,7 6,03 6,03 -0,1 1,0 5,10 5,21 -1,2 0,9
Months since last employment 
(past 3 years) 24,20 23,17 7,4 0,4 25,01 24,35 5,0 0,7 26,15 26,56 -3,2 0,8
Months with welfare benefits past 
6 months 3,16 3,23 -3,4 0,7 3,39 3,20 8,7 0,5 3,91 3,92 -0,8 1,0
Months with welfare benefits the 
rest of the past 3 years 11,23 10,31 9,8 0,3 11,31 9,90 14,7 0,2 12,01 12,08 -0,7 1,0
Years with labour income 6,92 6,62 3,9 0,6 5,65 5,51 2,1 0,8 5,58 5,90 -4,8 0,7
Income from labour last year 
(in 1 000 NOK) 29,87 35,39 -7,4 0,3 27,60 30,09 -3,5 0,7 24,91 22,60 4,5 0,7
Local unemployment rate  3,78 3,80 -2,2 0,7 4,30 4,20 10,8 0,3 4,22 4,26 -4,8 0,7
Densely populated area (per cent) 93 95 -6,9 0,2 92 93 -3,7 0,7 86 89 -6,7 0,6
Source: FD-Trygd, Statistics Norway. 
 
